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GUANTA´NAMO BAY AND THE EVOLUTION OF
INTERNATIONAL LEASES AND SERVITUDES
Michael J. Strauss*
INTRODUCTION
Territorial leases and servitudes are recognized in both inter-
national law and international relations as means by which states
may exercise control over territories without having sovereignty
over them.1  They allow states to reallocate sovereign rights over
specific areas without transferring title to the territories in question
or altering state boundaries.  As such, they act as legal and political
mechanisms for addressing the interests of states when these inter-
ests evolve in ways that are incompatible with the boundaries that
define their territory.
It is in this context that Guanta´namo Bay exists as a distinct
territorial space with a legal and political character.  A closer look
at the phenomena of state-to-state leases and servitudes is thus use-
ful for understanding their contribution to questions of law that
have arisen at Guanta´namo Bay.  The responses to these questions
may in turn have a reciprocal impact on the law of international
leases and servitudes more generally.  Leases between states are typ-
ically embodied in treaties or other bilateral agreements, and are
the legal instruments that create the servitudes by which states ex-
ercise sovereign competences on other states’ territory.2  Deriving
from private law leases and servitudes, they form a peripheral
theme in international law, sparsely studied relative to other as-
pects and widely regarded as marginal,3 although they tend to push
* Ph.D. (summa cum laude), International Relations and Diplomacy, Centre
d’Etudes Diplomatiques et Strate´giques, Paris, 2006.  M.S., Columbia University Grad-
uate School of Journalism, 1976.  International Fellow, Columbia University School of
International Affairs, 1975–1976.  B.A., University of Minnesota School of Journalism
and Mass Communication, 1975.
1 See MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 366–67 (4th ed. 1997).  Interna-
tional leases refer to agreements between states that permit a foreign entity to obtain
“control of usually strategic points without the necessity of actually annexing the terri-
tory.” Id. at 366. International servitudes exist “where the territory of one state is
under a particular restriction in the interests of the territory of another state.” Id. at
367. Both give rise to rights in rem. Id. at 366.
2 Michael John Strauss, The Viability of Territorial Leases in Resolving Interna-
tional Sovereignty Disputes: A Comparative Study 120 (Apr. 2006) (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, Centre d’Etudes Diplomatiques et Strategiques, Paris) (on file with
The New York City Law Review) (citing Id.).
3 E.g., they occupy three of 939 pages in MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW
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its margins outward by posing challenges to established legal con-
cepts such as sovereignty and jurisdiction.  As such, they provide an
impetus for international law to evolve.
When states have objectives that require access to territory be-
yond their boundaries, leasing the area in question may be deemed
the most desirable option when the risks and costs of securing that
access by other means are weighed against it.  Each party to a nego-
tiated lease derives benefits—the lessee state obtains rights on ad-
ditional territory, while the lessor state’s benefits can range from
being specific, direct, tangible and/or immediate (i.e., monetary
compensation) to being general, indirect, intangible and/or long-
term (i.e., a step toward improving political or economic relations).
Surveys of international leases and servitudes have shown
them to be mostly ad hoc arrangements, tailored to address specific
issues that arise among states in their interactions with one an-
other.4  The goals are usually economic, military, administrative or
diplomatic, and on occasion the aim has been to resolve conflicts
about sovereignty over territory.
As each lease has unique features for the circumstances at
hand, territorial leases can reflect a degree of pragmatism and
even creativity for which international law and previous diplomatic
experience may provide little guidance.  The gaps they can reveal
in established legal notions explain why such leases and the beha-
viour of states in relation to them are prone to be ongoing sources
of new legal questions about sovereignty and jurisdiction.  The
lease of Guanta´namo Bay by the United States from Cuba in 1903
raised such questions right from the start, as evidenced by the at-
tention they received from international law scholars within its first
decade of implementation.5
The Guanta´namo Bay lease is particularly relevant to any gen-
eral discussion about territorial leases and servitudes because of its
influence on these broader notions themselves.  It was concluded
at a time when states were actively applying the concept of territo-
rial leasing to a variety of new situations, and was the first major
366–68 (4th ed. 1997) and four of 1,520 pages in NGUYEN QUOC DINH, PATRICK DAIL-
LIER & ALAIN PELLET, DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 484–87 (Librairie Ge´ne´rale de
Droit et de Jurisprudence, 7th ed. 2002).
4 See HELEN DWIGHT REID, INTERNATIONAL SERVITUDES IN LAW AND PRACTICE
(1932); F. A. VA´LI, SERVITUDES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: A STUDY OF RIGHTS IN FOREIGN
TERRITORY (Stevens & Sons Ltd., 2d ed. 1958).
5 See NAVAL WAR COLLEGE, INTERNATIONAL LAW SITUATIONS 1907 9–22 (1908)
[hereinafter NAVAL WAR COLLEGE 1907]; NAVAL WAR COLLEGE, INTERNATIONAL LAW
SITUATIONS 1912 93–113 (1912) [hereinafter NAVAL WAR COLLEGE 1912].
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lease in which the U.S. secured an area for military-related activity
within the territory of another state.6  This helped broaden the
range of objectives for which states routinely engage in territorial
leasing.7
The use of Guanta´namo Bay since 2002 as a detention center
for prisoners captured in U.S. anti-terrorism efforts abroad consti-
tutes another precedent:  it made Guanta´namo Bay the first leased
territory to be employed as a site for extra-jurisdictional activity—
actions by a state that are not authorized under its legal system on
its own territory, and that are also outside the jurisdiction of the
state that was obliged by the lease to relinquish its legal authority in
the territory where the actions occur.8
II. STATES, TERRITORY, AND TITLE
The innovative uses of Guanta´namo Bay illustrate that states
can perceive leased territories and their associated servitudes as
“laboratories” for implementing new interpretations and applica-
tions of established law in support of political or other objectives.
Leased territories are particularly exposed to this possibility be-
cause the basic concepts behind their existence—title to territory,
effective control and sovereignty—have been subject to divergent
theories, varying legal definitions and conflicting interpretations
over time.
Differences in these notions can be traced back to the core
relationship between states and territory.  Of various theories that
exist to explain this relationship, one currently enjoying considera-
ble favour among international law scholars is the juridical compe-
tence theory,9 which views territory as the area in which a state can
exercise its system of laws to the exclusion of other states.
6 Gary L. Maris, International Law and Guantanamo, 29 THE JOURNAL OF POLITICS
261, 263–64 (1967).
7 See VA´LI, supra note 4, at 208 (noting that “[p]rior to the Second World War
maintenance of military bases in foreign territory in time of peace” as was the case
with Guanta´namo “was a rather exceptional phenomenon”).
8 Strauss, supra note 2, at 119; see also Harold Hongju Koh, Dean of Yale Law
School, Statement before the Senate Judiciary Committee regarding the Nomination
of the Honorable Alberto R. Gonzales as Attorney General of the United States (Jan.
7, 2005), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id=1345&wit_id=3938
(testifying that in his legal opinion the use of Guanta´namo Bay, as the center for
indefinite detention and interrogation of foreign nationals, constitutes the use of an
international servitude as an “extra-legal zone”).
9 CHARLES ROUSSEAU, COURS DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 29–31 (Les Cours
de Droit 1956) (Fr.). This has also been called the jurisdictional theory. See E.N. van
Kleffens, Sovereignty in International Law: Five Lectures, in 82 RECUEIL DES COURS DE
L’ACADE´MIE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL DE LA HAYE 1, 96 (1953).
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But it is the territoire-objet theory, which considers territory as
the property of a state and the object of its power and exercise of
sovereignty,10 which provides a more direct basis for the notion of
territorial leases and servitudes.  This once-dominant theory was
said to have lost most of its adherents by the middle of the twenti-
eth century11 and some international law scholars consider it to be
no longer valid.12  However, it remains quite alive:  Brownlie, com-
menting on territorial title, writes “[i]n principle the concept of
ownership, opposable to all other states and unititular, can and
does exist in international law,”13 and Menon refers to territory as
“territorial property of a State[.]”14
Title-to-territory is the conceptual instrument that has evolved
in the context of international law to legitimize this property-like
relationship between a state and the territory on which it is located,
and to provide the state with legal competence on that territory.
The term is used interchangeably to denote both the facts em-
ployed in conferring a right as well as the right itself.15  The Inter-
national Court of Justice has broadened the scope of title-to-
territory by considering it to be not only documentary evidence of
a right, but also any other evidence that may establish the existence
of a right or the source of a right.16
It is widely agreed that title-to-territory is a prerequisite to sov-
ereignty.  “The concept of title involves in essence a description of
those legal and factual elements which by virtue of the norms of
international law must be present before territorial sovereignty
may be validly acquired or maintained,” according to Shaw.17  Like-
wise, Reuter has said that legal title “does not automatically grant
sovereignty, but creates the rights and obligations that are condu-
10 NGUYEN QUOC DINH ET AL., supra note 3, at 413–14.
11 van Kleffens, supra note 9, at 94–95 (“[T]he theory which proclaims territory to
be the property of a state is open to serious objections which explain its present
disfavour.”).
12 NGUYEN QUOC DINH ET AL., supra note 3, at 414.
13 IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 119 (6th ed. 2003).
14 P.K. Menon, Title to Territory:  Traditional Modes of Acquisition by States, 72 REVUE
DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 1, 2 (1994) (Switz.).
15 ANA GEMMA LO´PEZ MARTI´N, EL TERRITORIO ESTATAL EN DISCUSSIO´N: LA PREUEBA
DEL TI´TULO 8 (McGraw-Hill/Interamericana de Espan˜a 1999).
16 Case Concerning the Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Republic of Mali), 1986
I.C.J. 554, 564 (Dec. 22); see also International Court of Justice, Case Summaries—
Case Concerning the Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Republic of Mali), htp://www.
icj-cij.org/icjwww/icases/iHVM/ihvm_isummaries/ihvm_isummary_19861222.htm;
JOSHUA CASTELLINO & STEVE ALLEN, TITLE TO TERRITORY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: A
TEMPORAL ANALYSIS 25 (2003).
17 MALCOLM SHAW, TITLE TO TERRITORY IN AFRICA 16 (1986).
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cive for territorial sovereignty to exist,”18 and Brownlie calls sover-
eignty “a consequence of title and by no means conterminous with
it.”19
Traditional international law accepts that title can be obtained
in various ways – all related to the circumstances by which a state
whether existing or new – becomes associated with territory:
1. Occupation – the acquisition of territory that previously did
not pertain to any state (terra nullius).20
2. Prescription – the assumption and display of effective control
over another state’s territory without consent.21
3. Cession – the peaceful acquisition of another state’s terri-
tory.  This can result from victory in a conflict, agreements to sell
or exchange territory,22 or the transfer of territory as a gift.23
4. Conquest – the acquisition of territory by force.  Once a pri-
mary method of acquiring title, this is no longer the case since the
Charter of the United Nations outlawed the use of force.24
5. Accretion – the acquisition of territory created by nature ad-
jacent to a state,25 such as a new volcanic island or silt deposits in a
river delta.
6. Adjudication – the acquisition of territory through a judicial
decision.26
7. Conversion of an inchoate title. – the validation of a title that is
incomplete, such as one claimed symbolically, through a display of
control.27
The determination of title-to-territory has become more com-
plex over time, and today it also relies on additional factors such as
the explicit or tacit recognition of a state’s claim to title, or the
strength of a state’s ongoing involvement with the territory in ques-
tion.28  This involvement derives from effective control, which is
essential for establishing title through occupation and prescription
18 PAUL REUTER, DERECHO INTERNACIONAL PU´BLICO 111 (Jose´ Puente Egido trans.,
1962) (quotation translated by Author).
19 BROWNLIE, supra note 13, at 119.
20 Id. at 168.
21 Id. at 145–46.
22 Menon, supra note 14, at 17–18.
23 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE 1912, supra note 5, at 93.
24 U.N. Charter, art. 2, para. 4 (“All members shall refrain in their international
relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any state.”).
25 BROWNLIE, supra note 13, at 144–45.
26 Id. at 132.
27 LO´PEZ MARTI´N, supra note 15, at 16.
28 BROWNLIE, supra note 13, at 126–27.
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and which can strengthen an inchoate title to the point where it is
absolute.  Effective control is sometimes considered to be a legal
relationship similar to possession in private law, in which a state’s
activity (particularly administrative activity) reinforces what might
otherwise be a tenuous connection between state and territory.29
The importance of effective control in establishing title-to-ter-
ritory has been widely recognized for some time,30 and has influ-
enced the intertemporal aspect of territorial titles.  It was once
generally accepted that the applicable law for determining a title’s
validity should be the international law in force when a state ac-
quired territory, rather than any subsequent law.31  However, sev-
eral legal decisions in the last century have considered a state’s
ongoing relationship with a territory to be the more important
factor.32
Despite its importance to determining territorial title, effective
control is a concept in which no single standard of state behavior
prevails.  According to Schwarzenberger and Brown, “[the] degree
of effectiveness required varies with circumstances, such as the size
of the territory, the extent to which it is inhabited and, as in deserts
or polar regions, climatic conditions.”33  Yet effective control is an
important consideration in territorial leases because they rear-
range between states the activities by which control is determined,
and this brings sovereignty issues into the picture.
III. SOVEREIGNTY AND ITS LIMITS
The notion of sovereignty has also defied a uniform defini-
tion.  Its essential components parallel those of a state itself—terri-
tory, population, and government—but as many as 12 distinct and
overlapping meanings of sovereignty have been identified as the
term applies to states.34  Michael Fowler and Julie Bunck admit that
29 Id. at 133–34; GEORG SCHWARZENBERGER & E.D. BROWN, A MANUAL OF INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 97 (6th ed. 1976).
30 See, e.g., Minquiers and Ecrehos (Fr. v. U.K), 1953–55  I.C.J. 47 (Nov. 17, 1953);
WOLFGANG G. FRIEDMANN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 442–49
(1969).
31 BROWNLIE, supra note 13, at 135–37.
32 See, e.g., Island of Palmas (Neth. v. U.S.), 2 R.I.A.A. 829 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1928);
PETER MALANCZUK, AKEHURST’S MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW
155–56 (7th ed. 1997); FRIEDMANN ET AL., supra note 30, at 442–44. See also Legal
Status of the South-Eastern Territory of Greenland (Den. v. Nor.), 1933 P.C.I.J. (ser.
E) No. 9, at 120–21 (Aug. 2–3) discussed in FRIEDMANN ET AL., supra note 30, at 451;
Minquiers and Ecrehos, 1953–55 I.C.J. at 63–69.
33 SCHWARZENBERGER & BROWN, supra note 29, at 97.
34 Winston P. Nagan & Craig Hammer, The Changing Character of Sovereignty in Inter-
national Law and International Relations 3–5 (Univ. Fla. Coll. L., Working Paper, 2006),
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the meaning “varies according to the issue that is being addressed
or the question that is being asked.”35  The term as used in this
article will refer to the totality of a state’s exclusive authority on its
territory plus extensions of that authority outside of it.36
The sovereignty concept is mired in “chicken-or-egg” situa-
tions, with scholars disagreeing on whether it derives from a state’s
power over territory37 or vice versa.38  Similarly, the broad accept-
ance that title-to-territory is a precondition for sovereignty has not
prevented suggestions that the reverse is true.  The judgment by
arbitrator Max Huber in the Island of Palmas (Miangas) Case39 men-
tions title-to-territory as being able to confer territorial sover-
eignty,40 but later in the same ruling, he notes that title can be
“founded on continuous and peaceful display of sovereignty.”41
While the vast majority of a state’s manifestations of sover-
eignty are internal—within its territorial boundaries—territorial
leases and servitudes are among various phenomena that allow
states to display sovereign competences externally.42  The geo-
graphical dimensions of a state’s sovereign reach thus exceed the
dimensions of its territory.
Sovereignty was once envisioned as absolute authority, and as
available at http://www.law.ufl.edu/faculty/publications/pdf/sov.pdf.  Sovereignty
may refer to a symbol for “absolute, unlimited control or power; . . . political legiti-
macy; . . . political authority; . . . self-determined, national independence; . . . govern-
ance and constitutional order; . . . juridical personality of Sovereign Equality . . .
‘recognition’ . . . powers, immunities, or privileges; . . . jurisdictional competence to
make and/or apply law; . . . [and] basic governance competences.”  It can be a crite-
rion of jurisprudential validation of all law and a formal unit of a legal system. Id.
35 MICHAEL ROSS FOWLER & JULIE MARIE BUNCK, LAW, POWER, AND THE SOVEREIGN
STATE: THE EVOLUTION AND APPLICATION OF THE CONCEPT OF SOVEREIGNTY 6 (1995).
36 Strauss, supra note 2, at 32 (noting that debate among international law scholars
concerning the relationship between territorial boundaries and political authority re-
quires “a broad but workable definition of sovereignty” to discuss issues of sovereignty
as they relate to the U.S. lease of Guanta´namo Bay).
37 Jean Combacau, Pas une puissance, une liberte´: la souverainete´ de l’Etat, 67
POUVOIRS 47, 50 (1993) (Fr.); Albert Rigaudie`re, L’invention de la souverainete´, 67
POUVOIRS 5, 5 (1993) (Fr.).
38 Rigaudie`re, supra note 37.
39 Island of Palmas (Neth. v. U.S.), 2 R.I.A.A. 829 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1928).
40 Id. at 845.
41 Id. at 869.
42 Strauss, supra note 2, at 38–39; see also NGUYEN QUOC DINH ET AL., supra note 3,
at 483–503 (positing that competencies related to external sovereignty fall into one of
three general categories –– “minor competences outside of state borders[,]” “author-
ity over natural and legal persons[,]” and “competences relating to public services”)
cited in Strauss, supra note 2, at 35–36 (noting that included within the third category
is “a state’s authority to conduct administrative or military activities outside of its terri-
tory in support of the interests of the state”).
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such it was considered indivisible, unable to be fragmented.43
While it is not viewed as absolute today, many scholars still consider
it indivisible in substance while allowing for the exercise of sover-
eignty to be divisible.44  Another mainstream theory holds sover-
eignty itself is the sum of a potentially variable set of state
competences, with states able to supplement or trim their “total”
sovereignty by adding or divesting individual competences.45
The divisibility of competences, whether through the exercise
of sovereignty or by its nature, yields the notion that sovereignty
can have limits—a view embraced by international law and one
that provides the groundwork for states to establish territorial
leases and servitudes.  Carlos Ferna´ndez de Casadevante Romani
notes that states accept having such limits as “the price they must
pay for international cooperation.”46  In fact, a state’s sovereignty is
capable of withstanding a number of specific limits without deterio-
rating, and there are various ways this occurs:
1. Implicit reconfirmation of a state’s core sovereign status – states
implicitly recognize the underlying sovereign status of other states
with which they sign treaties, even when a treaty constrains ele-
ments of a state’s sovereignty.47
2. A limit on one aspect of sovereignty may be offset by a gain in
another – states may exercise reciprocal authority on each other’s
territory or join an international process that creates limits on the
sovereignty of all member states while giving each one a role in the
mechanism that replaces it.48
3. A non-sovereign benefit may enhance a state’s sovereignty – when
the benefit of accepting a limit on sovereignty is not sovereign in
nature (i.e., political, material or financial compensation), it can
be seen in sovereign terms if it reinforces a state’s ability to effec-
tively control its territory.49
4. A state retains its sovereign competence to withdraw from a restric-
tive arrangement – this competence is displayed by renouncing a
treaty or leaving an international organization.50
43 WIKTOR SUKIENNICKI, ESSAI SUR LA SOUVERAINETE´ DES ETATS EN DROIT INTERNA-
TIONAL MODERNE 84 (A. Pedone, Ed. 1926); van Kleffens, supra note 9, at 85–87.
44 van Kleffens, supra note 9, at 87.
45 See FOWLER & BUNCK, supra note 35, at 64–70.
46 CARLOS FERNA´NDEZ DE CASADEVANTE ROMANI, DERECHO INTERNACIONAL PU´BLICO
127 (2003) (quotation translated by author).
47 See BROWNLIE, supra note 13, at 93.
48 Id. at 289–90 (citing the United Nations as an example of an international
mechanism that limits state sovereignty).
49 Strauss, supra note 2, at 42.
50 Id. (“Ecuador and Gabon left the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Coun-
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5. A state automatically regains a relinquished element of sovereignty
upon termination of the limit – this occurs when a treaty is renounced
or expires, when a state leaves an international arrangement that
entails limits on its sovereignty, or when such an arrangement is
disbanded.51
While limits on a state’s competences do not necessarily en-
danger its sovereignty, they do influence where that sovereignty re-
sides, and this is seen most notably with territorial leases and
servitudes.  These phenomena force sovereignty to be viewed in
terms of its limits, as the rights transferred by one state to another
are sometimes so comprehensive that they raise questions about
which state actually has effective control over the territory
involved.52
It is not unknown for a lessee state to try to obtain sovereignty
over a territory where the shift of rights leaves the lessor state so
sidelined that it risks losing title to the area.  The 1903 treaty in
which Panama authorized the U.S. to act as “if it were sovereign”53
in the Canal Zone prompted divergent views within the American
government about “[w]hether the grant in the treaty amounts to a
complete cession of territory and dominion to the United States or
is so limited that it leaves at least titular sovereignty in the Republic
of Panama[.]”54  The Guanta´namo Bay lease raises the same ques-
tions55 and, as we shall see shortly, the fact that the U.S. has not
sought sovereignty over the territory is critical to the legal ques-
tions that currently occupy us.
Because territorial leases can provide an avenue for the poten-
tial transfer of title and sovereignty, their preservation becomes a
tries (OPEC) in 1992 and 1996 respectively, reportedly because they could not afford
its annual membership dues.”).
51 Id. (League of Nations and the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization are exam-
ples of disbanded and expired international organizations).
52 See DIANNE E. RENNACK & MARK P. SULLIVAN, U.S.–CUBAN RELATIONS:  AN ANA-
LYTIC COMPENDIUM OF U.S. POLICIES, LAWS & REGULATIONS 301 (2005) (noting that
many Cuban scholars argue that “the Guantanamo agreement, which has no end
date, contradicts Cuba’s right of sovereignty[,]” and that “the continuation of the
U.S. presence on the basis of this treaty is a fac¸ade, given the hostility in U.S.–Cuban
relations since the early 1960s”), available at http://www.acus.org/docs/0503-U.S.-Cu-
ban_Relations_Analytic_Compendium_Policies_Laws_Regulations.
53 Convention regarding the Isthmian Canal, U.S.—Pan., Nov. 18, 1903 – Feb. 26,
1904, 10 Bevans 663, 664 (1972), available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/
diplomacy/panama/pan001.htm [hereinafter the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty].
54 Luckenbach S.S. Co. v. United States, 280 U.S. 173, 177 (1930).
55 Maris, supra note 6, at 262; Hanna Danwall, Guanta´namo Bay, a Legal “Black
Hole”? 26–27 (2004) (unpublished master’s thesis, University of Lund), http://www.
jur.lu.se/Internet/Biblioteket/Examensarbeten.nsf/0/D8D0324D94417D16C1256F
A9005EF2BD/$File/exam.pdf?OpenElement (last visited June 24, 2007).
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critical factor for the lessor state once it determines that a lease is
in its interest.  Indeed, it has long been debated whether territorial
leases, by their very nature, actually constitute cessions.  Scholars
taking this view a century ago referred to leases as territorial trans-
fers in disguise56 or as a step toward annexation.57  The British ter-
ritorial lease negotiator Lord Curzon noted that “the tendency of
Leases is, from being temporary to become permanent, and, in
fact, to constitute a rudimentary form of ulterior possession.”58
Such thinking persisted into the second half of the 20th century59
but waned amid resistance from legal scholars like Va´li, who ar-
gued that “in every case the grantor State still retains certain rights
in or over the territory thus transferred” and that its sovereignty is
expressly preserved.60
Lingering sensitivity from this issue still affects the terminol-
ogy of territorial leasing.  Many treaties creating leases use words
such as “lease” and “rent,” and references to these terms while the
lease is in force can reaffirm the lessor state’s sovereignty over the
territory and the lessee state’s acquiescence to it.61  Yet some states
avoid using such words because of the connotations they had—and
may still have—with popular opinion.  Hence the constitutions of a
few states, including Venezuela and Paraguay, explicitly prohibit
the leasing of their territory to other states.62  Israel’s lease of two
small areas from Jordan as part of the Peace Treaty of 199463 is
widely acknowledged as a lease, but both states felt obliged to deny
it that name:  Israel’s then-prime minister said it was “not a leasing
56 Louis Ge´rard, DES CESSIONS DE´GUISE´ES DE TERRITOIRES EN DROIT IN-
TERNATIONAL PUBLIC [Doctoral Dissertation, Universite´ de Nancy] ii–iv (Im-
primerie Nancienne 1903).
57 Jean Perrinjaquet, DES CESSIONS TEMPORAIRES DE TERRITOIRES E´TUDE
DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL [Doctoral Dissertation, Universite´ de Bordeaux] 365
(Imprimerie Commerciale et Industrielle 1904).
58 Lord Curzon of Kedleston, Romanes Lecture on Frontiers at Oxford (Nov. 2,
1907) (transcript available at http://www.dur.ac.uk/resources/ibru/resources/links/
curzon.pdf).
59 ROUSSEAU, supra note 9, at 114–15 (adding, however, that the return of some
leased territories to the lessor states might justify modifying this view); see Danwall,
supra note 55, at 35, which notes how these ideas are no longer accepted in interna-
tional law.
60 VA´LI, supra note 4, at 273–74.
61 Strauss, supra note 2, at 121 (noting by way of example that the Convention of
Paris of 1898 allowed France to annex the rights to two pieces of territory along the
Niger River and paid “rent” to Great Britain as part of the “lease”).
62 Constitucio´n de la Repu´blica Bolivariana de Venezuela art. 13; Constitucio´n de
la Republica del Paraguay art. 155.
63 Treaty of Peace Between The State of Israel and The Hashemite Kingdom of
Jordan, Isr.–Jordan, Oct. 26, 1994, 34 I.L.M. 43 (1995) [hereinafter Jordan-Israel
Peace Treaty].
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arrangement,”64 and a Jordanian negotiator of the treaty said, “the
deal was not that of a lease, it was a Jordanian permission.”65
The practice of states has shown that some leased territories
ultimately were ceded to the lessee state, while others were not.66
The recent return of full control over several prominent leased ter-
ritories to the lessor states (Hong Kong in 1997,67 Macao in 199968
and the Canal Zone in 200069) may indicate a trend toward con-
firming the lessor’s sovereignty.  Historically, however, it appears
that a mix of factors affect whether this happens: the interests of
the states; their relations with each other; and their specific inten-
tions vis-a`-vis the territory when the servitude is created, during its
existence and upon its expiration.  In the case of Guanta´namo Bay,
the U.S. has linked its potential return to Cuba to a specific inter-
est—that of seeing a change in Cuba’s form of government toward
a democracy.70  Thus, while international law may be the vehicle by
which territorial leases are created, international relations become
the determinant of their fate.
IV. COMPONENTS OF TERRITORIAL LEASES
The details contained in a territorial lease can reciprocally af-
fect the broader relations between the states involved; for example,
the Guanta´namo Bay lease has contributed to the poor relation-
ship between the U.S. and Cuba since the Cuban Revolution of
1959.71  These details normally fall into three main areas:  the com-
petences to be transferred to the lessee state, the duration of the
arrangement, and the compensation to be paid to the lessor.
64 PM Rabin at Knesset Debate on the Approval of Israel–Jordan Peace Treaty
(Oct. 25, 1994) (transcript available at http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Archive/
Speeches/PM%20RABIN%20AT%20KNESSET%20DEBATE%20ON%20THE%20
APPROVAL%20OF%20ISRA).
65 MUNTHER J. HADDADIN, DIPLOMACY ON THE JORDAN: INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT
AND NEGOTIATED RESOLUTION 394 (2002).
66 Elie van Bogaert, The Lease of Territory in International Law, in MISCELLANEA—
W.J. GANSHOF VAN DER MEERSCH 315, 316 (E´tablissements E´mile Bruylant 1972)
(Fr.).
67 Edward A. Gargan, Time of Uncertainty Begins: Will Beijing Honor Vows?, N.Y.
TIMES, July 1, 1997 at A1.
68 Mark Landler, Colonialism Ending in Asia As China Reclaims Macao, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 19, 1999 at A1.
69 To Cheers, Panama Takes Over the Canal, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 2000 at A16.
70 See infra text accompanying note 141.
71 Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Declaracio´n del Gobierno de la Repu´blica
de Cuba a la opinion pu´blica nacional e internacional (Jan. 11, 2002), http://eu-
ropa.cubaminrex.cu/CDH/60cdh/Guantanamo/
Base%20naval%20de%20guantanamo.htm (last visited July 29, 2007) [hereinafter
Statement from the Ministry of Foreign Relations].
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The elaboration of competences is the portion most directly
linked to the objective of the lease and has the greatest scope for
variation.  The rights that are transferred may be narrow, such as
the ability to exercise a single competence under detailed and lim-
ited conditions, or comprehensive, ranging up to the ability to ex-
ercise all administrative, legislative and juridical competences
without restraint.  This aspect of a territorial lease can pose
problems if its drafters do not make it adaptable.  Political, social,
economic and other factors that exist when a lease is negotiated
continue to evolve after it enters into force, and a divergence can
emerge between the rights elaborated in the lease and the interests
of the states involved.  This is precisely what happened with the
lease of Guanta´namo Bay:  its objectives, to provide the U.S. with a
coaling station and naval base, grew technologically and politically
outmoded.72
The other two elements of a territorial lease, duration and
compensation, shape the structural and administrative obligations
to which the participating states agree to adhere.  These elements
act as further acknowledgements of sovereignty.
Several models have evolved for establishing the duration of a
territorial lease:
1. Fixed term – this entails an expiration date on which the
territory reverts to the lessor state.73  Prolonging the lease would
require a new agreement.74  An example was the 99-year lease of
Hong Kong’s New Territories by Great Britain from China, which
ended in 1997.75
72 California State Military Museum, Historic California Posts, Stations and Air-
fields:  Naval Net Depot, Tuburon, http://www.militarymuseum.org/Tiburon.html
(last visited July 30, 2007) (noting that by the early 1930s “[o]il had replaced coal as a
fuel for Navy ships” forcing the closure or modification of many naval coaling
stations).
73 Strauss, supra note 2, at 125 (noting that a fixed term can be either explicit or
implicit). See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP. : LANDLORD AND TENANT
§ 1.4 (1977) (“A landlord–tenant relationship may be created to endure for any fixed
or computable period of time.”); Id. § 1.4, cmt. a (1977) (“A lease is for a fixed period
of time when it specifies its beginning date and its termination date as calendar dates.
A lease is for a computable period of time when it specifies a formula for determining
the beginning and termination dates.”); Strauss, supra note 2, at 125 (citing ROUS-
SEAU, supra note 9, at 480) (noting that fixed term leases between sovereign states are
generally for terms of 25, 50, or 99 years).
74 Strauss, supra note 2, at 125 (noting that a lease can be “prolonged by a new
agreement, [if] both states had treaty-making competence”). See generally RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF PROP. : LANDLORD AND TENANT § 1.4 cmt. e (1977) (“A tenancy for
a fixed or computable period of time expires without notice at the end of the
period.”).
75 Lease of the New Territories, China–Gr. Brit., June 9, 1898, http://
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2. Fixed term with automatic renewal – the term may be fixed but
with an automatic renewal clause that can prolong it unless action
is initiated to halt the renewal.76  This was the nature of the lease
arrangements in the Israeli-Jordanian Peace Treaty of 1994.77
3. Term contingent on events – the timing of the expiration may
depend on events.  This was seen in reciprocal leases in 1894 be-
tween Great Britain and Belgium that involved territory in the
Congo Free State, then under Belgian control.78  The lease for part
of the territory was to expire at the end of the reign of Belgium’s
King Leopold II (it did, in 1909), and for another part of the terri-
tory it was to last as long as the Congo remained Belgian.79
4. Indefinite term with provision for termination – the term may be
left indeterminate, with the lease defining circumstances by which
it can be ended.80  The Guanta´namo Bay lease is this type, with two
possible means of “termination” – the abandonment by the U.S. of
the naval base, or an agreement between the U.S. and Cuba to end
the lease.81
5. Perpetuity – this reflects the intention of permanence, an
example being the perpetual lease granting France sovereign
rights in Quinto Real Norte (Pays Quint Septentrional), a small
territory in Spain.82  A term of perpetuity is not necessarily borne
out in actual practice, as was shown with the U.S. lease of the Canal
www.yearbook.gov.hk/2004/en/21_04.htm (last visited Aug. 12, 2007) [hereinafter
Hong Kong Lease].
76 Strauss, supra note 2, at 125 (“[The lease] may stipulate a fixed term, but with an
automatic renewal clause that can make its term indefinite in actual practice”). See
generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP. : LANDLORD AND TENANT § 1.5 cmt. d (1977)
(“The parties may expressly state that the lease shall continue from period to period
or their agreement may be apparent from the circumstances.”).
77 Jordan–Israel Peace Treaty, supra note 63, at Annex 1(b)(6).
78 BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE & RESEARCH, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE , PUBL’N NO. 106,
SUDAN–DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO (ZAIRE) BOUNDARY 2 (1978), available at
http://www.law.fsu.edu/library/collection/limitsinseas/IBS106.pdf.
79 Id. at 3.
80 Strauss, supra note 2, at 126. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP. :
LANDLORD AND TENANT § 1.7 cmt. a (1977) (“A tenancy is ‘terminable’ on the occur-
rence of an event if the event automatically terminates the tenancy, or if the event
gives a party the option to terminate the tenancy by notice to the other party.”).
81 Treaty Between the United States of America and Cuba, U.S.—Cuba, May
29–June 9, 1934, 6 Bevans 1161, 1162 (1971), available at http://www.yale.edu/law-
web/avalon/diplomacy/cuba/cuba001.htm [hereinafter Treaty Between the United
States and Cuba—May 1934].
82 The Treaty of the Limits signed in 1856 ratified in Bayonne in 1857 with an
additional convention agreed upon in 1858.  Strauss, supra note 2, at 175; J.R.
Remacha, Review of La Frontera Hispano-Francesa y las Relaciones de vecindad (espe-
cial referencia al sector fronterizo del Paı´s Vasco) by Carlos Ferna´ndez de Casadevante
Romani (1985), 81 AMER. J. OF INT’L LAW 967, 967–68 (1987).
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Zone from Panama; it was leased in perpetuity in 1903, but was
returned to Panama in 2000.83
A territorial lease may be legally terminated regardless of its
intended duration under certain conditions.  These include the
doctrine of unequal treaties, if the lease is between a dominant
state and a weak state;84 the emergence of a peremptory norm of
international law that is incompatible with a territorial lease;85 the
implied right of denunciation when a lease established by treaty
has no provision for termination or withdrawal;86 the principle of
clausula rebus sic stantibus, which holds that a lease can be termi-
nated if there is a fundamental change of circumstances;87 and a
material breach of a lease’s provisions.88   The ending of a territo-
rial lease during its term may also be brought about if the partici-
pating states revise or replace the treaty that creates it,89 by the
transfer of title to the leased territory from the lessor state to the
lessee state in accordance with the means of establishing title, or by
the disappearance of one of the contracting states.90
The nature of compensation paid by the lessee state to the
lessor state can take various forms.  It may be related to the objec-
tive of the lease, or to the issue of sovereignty over the territory
concerned.  The payment is not necessarily monetary – it may be in
the form of goods or services, or a concession such as favorable
terms in a separate transaction:
1. Periodic payment based on economic value – a periodic pay-
ment, typically annual, may be stipulated on the basis of the eco-
nomic value of the leased territory or of the rights obtained by the
lessee state.91  This was initially the case with the Guanta´namo Bay
83 Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty, supra note 53.
84 Alfred de Zayas, The Status of Guanta´namo Bay and the Status of the Detainees, 37
U.B.C. L. REV. 277, 300, 301–04 (2004).
85 Id. at 300, 304–05.
86 Id. at 300, 305–06.
87 Id. at 300, 307.
88 Id. at 300, 307–08.
89 See Panama Canal Treaty, U.S.–Pan., Sept. 7, 1977, 16 I.L.M. 1022 [hereinafter
Carter–Torrijos Treaty].  The U.S. lease of the Canal Zone from Panama by way of the
Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty was terminated, and replaced with the Carter–Torrijos
Treaty. Id.
90 LEON YANG (YANG LIEOU–FONG), Les Territories a´ bail en Chine: Etude
d’Histoire diplomatique et de Droit international  [Doctoral Dissertation, Universite´
de Paris] 155–56 (Les Presses Universitaires de France 1929).
91 Strauss, supra note 2, at 129.  In the example of the pasturage servitude created
by the Treaty of Limits in 1856, two factors were used to decide on “the annual pay-
ment that France would make to Spain for grazing rights—the revenues of French
farmers that could be attributed to using the pastures in Spain, and the rent in a
previous lease agreement concluded between the valleys involved”). Id. See generally
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lease.92
2. Periodic token payment to acknowledge sovereignty – a periodic
token payment may be required as affirmation by the lessee state of
the lessor’s sovereignty over the territory.93  The payment becomes
a recurring display of recognition of the lessor’s claim to title, as
was explicitly stated when Great Britain leased Kashmir to Mahara-
jah Gulab Singh in the 1846 Treaty of Amritsar.94
3. Payment stipulated but waived – a lease that includes compen-
sation to acknowledge the lessor state’s sovereignty may waive the
requirement for actual payment.95  In this case, the lessee displays
its recognition of the lessor state’s title-to-territory only once, by
the act of agreeing to the payment.96  India thus leased the tiny
area of Tin Bigha to Bangladesh for an annual amount that equal-
led less than $0.05, and waived its right to make Bangladesh pay
it.97
4. Single payment – a lease may involve a one-time payment
rather than periodic payments.  This was apparently the case when
the U.S. leased the Chagos Islands from Great Britain for 50 years
in 1966 to install a military base on the island of Diego Garcia.98
The compensation terms were kept secret, but it was reported in
the press that the U.S. gave the U.K. a discount on the Polaris nu-
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: TENANT’S OBLIGATION TO PAY RENT § 12.1, cmt. a
(1977) (“The rent reserved in the lease may be a specified dollar amount or may be
an amount to be calculated on the basis of subsequent events.”); Id. § 12.1, cmt. c
(“The terms of the lease may specify that the rent reserved is payable weekly, monthly,
quarterly or for any other period of time, and may specify that it is payable in advance
or at the end or at some time during the period the rent specified is to cover.”).
92 Agreement between the United States of Cuba for the Lease of Certain Areas
for Naval or Coaling Stations, U.S.–Cuba, July 2–Oct.2, 1903, 6 Bevans 1120, 1120
(1971), available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/diplomacy/cuba/
cuba003.htm [hereinafter Coaling and Naval Stations Lease Agreement—July 1903].
93 Strauss, supra note 2, at 129.
94 Treaty of Amritsar, Gr. Brit.–Maharaja Gulab Singh, Mar. 16, 1846, available at
http://www.kashmir-information.com/LegalDocs/TreatyofAmritsar.html.
95 Strauss, supra note 2, at 130. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: TEN-
ANT’S OBLIGATION TO PAY RENT § 12.1, cmt. c (1977) (“The landlord may waive his
right to the prompt payment of rent by acting in such a manner that the tenant is led
to believe that a later date of payment than that specified in the lease is acceptable.”).
96 Strauss, supra note 2, at 130.
97 Terms of Lease in Perpetuity of Tin Bigha–Area, India–Bangl., Oct. 7, 1982,
http://www.hcidhaka.org/indbangla/index.html (follow “Click to view the Docu-
ments” hyperlink; then follow “Terms of Lease in perpetuity of Tin Bigha–Area”
hyperlink) (last visited Aug. 11, 2007).
98 Availability of Certain Indian Ocean Islands for Defense Purposes [Agreement],
U.S.–U.K., Dec. 30, 1966, 18.1 U.S.T. 28.
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clear weapons system as its payment.99
5. Payment not required – a lessee state may not be required to
make any payment to the lessor state.100  Great Britain’s lease of
Hong Kong’s New Territories from China in 1898 was this type.101
Apart from any financial benefit that accrues to a lessor state,
the importance of the compensation aspect of a territorial lease is
that it may affect the treaty’s duration: if the specified payment is
such that a lessee state’s failure to pay is considered a material
breach, international law permits the lessor state to void the lease
and end the servitude.102
In this regard, it should be noted that the nature of the pay-
ment can change over time.  Cases have occurred—and the Guan-
ta´namo Bay lease is an example—when a payment originally linked
to a servitude’s economic value has become a token payment by
remaining at the amount initially fixed, while economic circum-
stances and currency rates evolved.103
A state’s behaviour regarding payment may also be relevant in
voiding a lease.  Besides the obvious circumstance of a lessee state
declining to pay, a lessor state may act in ways that influence the
lease’s future.  Guanta´namo Bay once again illustrates this – Cuba
has declined for decades to cash the U.S. rent checks it receives, in
order not to undermine its arguments for ending the treaty.104
V. THE GUANTA´NAMO BAY LEASE
Let us now examine the Guanta´namo Bay lease and servitude
more closely as they relate to the context described above.  Histori-
cally, the lease grew out of the U.S. victory in the Span-
ish–American War of 1898, when Spain relinquished its claim to
99 Marjorie Miller, Britain Illegally Expelled Chagos Islanders for U.S. Base, L.A. TIMES,
Nov. 4, 2000, at A9.
100 Strauss, supra note 2, at 131.
101 Hong Kong Lease, supra note 75.
102 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 60, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331, available at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/
1_1_1969.pdf.
103 See Kathleen T. Rhem, Guanta´namo Bay Base Has Storied Past, Armed Forces Press
Service (Aug. 25, 2004),  http://www.news.navy.mil/search/print.asp?story_id=1490
2&VIRIN=&imagetype=0&page=1 (last visited on June 23, 2007) (noting that the orig-
inal lease price of $2,000 was “renegotiated” only once in 1934 to $4,085 per year).
104 Id. (noting that the U.S. military reports that every July the State Department
sends President Castro a check, but to date he has “only cashed one—in 1959, the
year he took power). See also JOHN POMFRET, THE HISTORY OF GUANTANAMO BAY, VOL.
II, available at http://www.nsgtmo.navy.mil/history/gtmohistoryvol2ch1.htm (noting
that Cuba accepted payment up until 1958, but stating that President Castro cashed
two checks).
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sovereignty and title to Cuba in a peace treaty that made the U.S.
the occupying power on the island pending the establishment of
an independent Cuban government.105
Five main steps toward developing the lease and servitude can
be identified, the first being the so-called Platt Amendment, an act
passed by Congress in March 1901,106 and attached to Cuba’s new
constitution as a condition for the end of American occupation.
Article VII of this act stated:
That to enable the United States to maintain the independence
of Cuba, and to protect the people thereof, as well as for its own
defense [sic], the government of Cuba will sell or lease to the
United States lands necessary for coaling or naval stations at cer-
tain specified points to be agreed upon with the President of the
United States.107
This led to the conclusion of a leasing agreement in February
1903 that covered two areas, Guanta´namo Bay and Bahia
Honda:108
Article I.  The Republic of Cuba hereby leases to the United
States, for the time required for the purposes of coaling and
naval stations, the following described areas of land and water
situated in the Island of Cuba:
[The article then details the geographical coordinates that
define the perimeters of Guanta´namo Bay and Bahia Honda.]
Article II.  The grant of the foregoing Article shall include
the right to use and occupy the waters adjacent to said areas of
land and water, and to improve and deepen the entrances
thereto and the anchorages therein, and generally to do any
and all things necessary to fit the premises for use as coaling or
naval stations only, and for no other purpose.
Vessels engaged in the Cuban trade shall have free passage
through the waters included within this grant.
Article III.  While on one hand the United States recognizes
the continuance of the ultimate sovereignty of the Republic of
Cuba over the above described areas of land and water, on the
other hand the Republic of Cuba consents that during the pe-
riod of the occupation by the United States of said areas under
105 Statement from the Ministry of Foreign Relations, supra note 71.
106 Treaty Establishing Relations with Cuba, U.S–Cuba, May 22, 1903–July 2, 1904,
6 Bevans 1116, 1116 (1971) (abrogated June 9, 1934, by Treaty of May 29, 1934)
[hereinafter Treaty Establishing Relations with Cuba].
107 Id. at 1117.
108 Agreement between the United States of Cuba for the Lease of Lands for Coal-
ing and Naval Stations, U.S.–Cuba, Feb. 16–23, 1903, 6 Bevans 1113 (1971), available
at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/diplomacy/cuba/cuba002.htm [hereinafter
Coaling and Naval Stations Lease Agreement—Feb. 1903].
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the terms of this agreement the United States shall exercise
complete jurisdiction and control over and within said areas
with the right to acquire (under conditions to be hereafter
agreed upon by the two Governments) for the public purposes
of the United States any land or other property therein by
purchase or by exercise of eminent domain with full compensa-
tion to the owners thereof.109
This was followed in July 1903 by a supplemental agreement
that made the terms of the lease more specific:110
Article I.  The United States of America agrees and cove-
nants to pay to the Republic of Cuba the annual sum of two
thousand dollars, in gold coin of the United States, as long as
the former shall occupy and use said areas of land by virtue of
said Agreement.
All private lands and other real property within said areas
shall be acquired forthwith by the Republic of Cuba.
The United States of America agrees to furnish to the Re-
public of Cuba the sums necessary for the purchase of said pri-
vate lands and properties and such sums shall be accepted by
the Republic of Cuba as advance payment on account of rental
due by virtue of said Agreement.
Article II.  The said areas shall be surveyed and their
boundaries distinctly marked by permanent fences or inclosures
[sic].
The expenses of construction and maintenance of such
fences or inclosures shall be borne by the United States.
Article III.  The United States of America agrees that no
person, partnership, or corporation shall be permitted to estab-
lish or maintain a commercial, industrial or other enterprise
within said areas.
Article IV.  Fugitives from justice charged with crimes or
misdemeanors amenable to Cuban Law, taking refuge within
said areas, shall be delivered up by the United States authorities
on demand by duly authorized Cuban authorities.
On the other hand the Republic of Cuba agrees that fugi-
tives from justice charged with crimes or misdemeanors amena-
ble to United States law, committed within said areas, taking
refuge in Cuban territory, shall on demand, be delivered up to
duly authorized United States authorities.
Article V.  Materials of all kinds, merchandise, stores and
munitions of war imported into said areas for exclusive use and
consumption therein, shall not be subject to payment of cus-
109 Id. at 1113–14.
110 Coaling and Naval Stations Lease Agreement—July 1903, supra note 92, at 1120.
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toms duties nor any other fees or charges and the vessels which
may carry same shall not be subject to payment of port, tonnage,
anchorage or other fees, except in case said vessels shall be dis-
charged without the limits of said areas; and said vessels shall
not be discharged without the limits of said areas otherwise than
through a regular port of entry of the Republic of Cuba when
both cargo and vessel shall be subject to all Cuban Customs laws
and regulations and payment of corresponding duties and fees.
It is further agreed that such materials, merchandise, stores
and munitions of war shall not be transported from said areas
into Cuban territory.
Article VI.  Except as provided in the preceding Article ves-
sels entering into or departing from the Bays of Guantanamo
and Bahia Honda within the limits of Cuban territory shall be
subject exclusively to Cuban laws and authorities and orders em-
anating from the latter in all that respects port police, Customs
or Health, and authorities of the United States shall place no
obstacle in the way of entrance and departure of said vessels ex-
cept in case of a state of war.111
By 1912, the U.S. Navy no longer needed the Bahia Honda site
but wanted to expand the Guanta´namo Bay naval station.112  This
led to the fourth step in developing the territorial entity of Guanta´-
namo Bay – a treaty that year by which the U.S. would give up its
lease of Bahia Honda in exchange for applying the Guanta´namo
Bay lease to a larger area.113  Neither the U.S. nor Cuba ratified the
treaty, and it never formally entered into force, but parts of it were
111 Id. at 1120–22.
112 President Taft included these issues in his 1912 State of the Union address, and
stated that:
There has been under discussion with the Government of Cuba for
some time the question of the release by this Government of its lease-
hold rights at Bahia Honda, on the northern coast of Cuba, and the
enlargement, in exchange therefor [sic], of the naval station which has
been established at Guantanamo Bay, on the south. As the result of the
negotiations thus carried on an agreement has been reached between
the two Governments providing for the suitable enlargement of the
Guantanamo Bay station upon terms which are entirely fair and equita-
ble to all parties concerned.
William Howard Taft, State of the Union Message (Dec. 3, 1912) (transcript available
at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29553) (last visited Aug. 11,
2007).
113 U.S. Dep’t of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United
States with the Annual Message of the President Transmitted to Congress December
3, 1912, http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-bin/FRUS/FRUS-idx?type=goto&id=
FRUS.FRUS1912&isize=M&submit=Go+to+page&page=295 (containing the text of
the Proposed agreement between the United States and Cuba for the enlargement of
the Guanta´namo Naval Station).
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nonetheless implemented – the U.S. gave up Bahia Honda, and
credible sources in both states reported that some expansion of the
45-square-mile Guantanamo Bay site did occur.114
The last step occurred in May 1934 when the status of the
lease and servitude at Guanta´namo Bay was reaffirmed without
changes in a U.S.–Cuban treaty whose relevant provision read:115
Article III.  Until the two contracting parties agree to the
modification or abrogation of the stipulations of the agreement
in regard to the lease to the United States of America of lands in
Cuba for coaling and naval stations signed by the President of
the Republic of Cuba on February 16, 1903, and by the Presi-
dent of the United States of America on the 23d day of the same
month and year, the stipulations of that agreement with regard
to the naval station of Guanta´namo shall continue in effect.
The supplementary agreement in regard to naval or coaling sta-
tions signed between the two Governments on July 2, 1903, also
shall continue in effect in the same form and on the same condi-
tions with respect to the naval station at Guanta´namo.  So long
as the United States of America shall not abandon the said naval
station of Guanta´namo or the two Governments shall not agree
to a modification of its present limits, the station shall continue
to have the territorial area that it now has, with the limits that it
has on the date of the signature of the present Treaty.116
VI. DISCUSSION OF THE LEASE
A. Competences and Rights
Given the choice of selling or leasing the territory to the U.S.,
Cuba successfully negotiated to make the arrangement for a lease
in order to minimize the extent of U.S. presence that it had agreed
114 In 1929 the Council on Foreign Relations noted that, while the treaty was never
ratified, “the United States gave up its rights at Bahia Honda for increased advantages
in the bay of Guantanamo, and now has virtually complete control over a tract of land
at Caimanera.” COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, SURVEY OF AMERICAN FOREIGN RELA-
TIONS 1929, at 24 (Thomas P. Howland ed., Yale University Press 1929).  In 1934,
Manuel Marquez Sterling, who served briefly as Cuba’s President and held positions
as a foreign minister and an ambassador to the U.S., referred to the treaty as “not
having been ratified but having been executed” with Guanta´namo Bay “having use of
the annexed territory,” M. MARQUEZ STERLING, PROCESO HISTORICO DE LA ENMIENDA
PLATT 432 (1941).  Additionally, a year later, the government historian in Havana,
international lawyer Emilio Roig de Leuchsenring, wrote that the area of the Guanta´-
namo Bay base had increased since 1912 and its actual boundaries were no longer
known. EMILIO ROIG DE LEUCHSENRING, HISTORIA DE LA ENMIENDA PLATT 291–92 (In-
stituto Cubano del Libro 1973) (1935).
115 Treaty Establishing Relations with Cuba, supra note 108, at 1162.
116 Id.
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to accept on the island.117  As Cuba’s then-president, Toma´s Es-
trada Palma noted,
of two formulas of grant, “sale” or “lease” . . . the one that would
least wound Cuban sentiment was accepted.  Of such stations we
granted the least number possible, and the conditions inserted
in the convention regulating the lease of the same are so many
more limitations of that grant, all favourable to the Republic of
Cuba.118
Had Cuba sold Guanta´namo Bay to the U.S. instead, title to
the territory would have been transferred and the existence of un-
ambiguous U.S. sovereignty would have made jurisdiction clearer.
Today’s legal questions can be traced directly to the fact that the
territory was leased – the arrangement allowed sovereign rights to
be separated from sovereignty, and that meant that Guanta´namo
Bay remained physically outside the area over which U.S. sover-
eignty exists.  The forced issue of jurisdiction to be addressed in
the lease,119 and the way it was done introduced uncertainty into
how the concept should be applied.
The lease gave the U.S. “complete jurisdiction and control” in
Guanta´namo Bay, but this was clear only in a relative sense, as it
gave U.S. total jurisdiction by reducing Cuba’s to nothing.120  It was
not clear whether “complete” equated U.S. jurisdiction in Guanta´-
namo Bay with the entirety of jurisdiction that a state would have
on its own sovereign territory.  George Grafton Wilson, editor of
International Law Situations at the Naval War College, commented
that while the lease was still new “the United States . . . has only a
qualified jurisdiction over these regions [Guanta´namo Bay and
Bahia Honda] and not sovereignty . . . and the conditions of exer-
cise of jurisdiction in these leased areas are accordingly unlike the
conditions within the areas over which the United States exercises
sovereignty.”121  Six decades later, Gary L. Maris of Stetson Univer-
sity commented that restrictive provisions of the lease meant that
117 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE 1912, supra note 5, at 101–04 (citing 31 Stat . 895 (1901)).
118 Id. at 104 (citing U.S. Foreign Relations 1903, at 365).
119 See NAVAL WAR COLLEGE 1907, supra note 5, at 10.  (“The jurisdiction based on
sovereignty is in general exclusive, though exceptions are sanctioned by international
law and international practice.  The jurisdiction based upon lease is naturally depen-
dent upon the conditions of the lease.  The leases vary.”).
120 Joseph Lazar, International Legal Status of Guanta´namo Bay, 62 AM J. INT’L L. 730,
739 (1968) (“[T]he United States has ‘complete jurisdiction and control’ so that she
has the power, viewed from the level of the international legal system, to expropriate
the ownership rights of the Republic of Cuba to the leased realty”).
121 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE  1907, supra note 5, at 18.
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jurisdiction at Guanta´namo “is not a carte blanche.”122  A more ex-
pansive view, recently expressed by Professor Kal Raustiala of Uni-
versity of California at Los Angeles (UCLA) Law School, is that
“complete” suggests “a special sort of control and jurisdiction, a
view consistent with the . . . interpretation that the United States is
a temporary sovereign for the duration of the lease.”123
Intertwined with the legal uncertainties about jurisdiction was
the issue of how the U.S. could use the territory it leased—as a
coaling station or naval base.124  Coal, commonly used as fuel for
naval vessels in 1903, had been superseded by oil by the time the
lease was reaffirmed in 1934.125  The U.S. Navy had already been
shutting down coaling stations elsewhere, and in fact the one at
Guanta´namo Bay was closed by 1938.126
Thus, even before the U.S. and Cuba acted to reaffirm the
lease of Guanta´namo Bay, advances in technology had rendered
one of the two goals of the lease obsolete.  The terms of the lease
did not anticipate this development or address any alternative to
coal technology, so any substitution of more modern fuels at the
supply station could have risked a dispute.  No dispute arose when
the concept of a naval base, the other permitted activity, evolved to
include fuelling stations in a broader sense.127
But just what constitutes a naval base?  What range of activities
may legitimately occur at one, and must these be in direct or indi-
rect support of a state’s naval operations in a strict sense for them
to comply with a servitude that allows one state to have a base on
another state’s territory?  The administrative and legal history of
Guanta´namo Bay shows that these questions have never been de-
finitively answered.  Indeed, the concept of a naval base was already
undergoing transition when the lease was signed in 1903. During
122 Maris, supra note 6, at 266.
123 Kal Raustiala, The Geography of Justice, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2501, 2541 (2005).
124 Coaling and Naval Stations Lease Agreement—Feb. 1903, supra note 108, at
1113.
125 M.E. Murphy, The History of Guanta´namo Bay 1494–1964, Vol. 1, Ch. 11 (origi-




127 See Randy B. Frye, Naval Station Guanta´namo Bay Fuel Summit Held, FUEL LINE
(Defense Energy Support Ctr., Fort Belvoir, Va.), Spring/Summer 2004, at 26, http:/
/www.desc.dla.mil/DCM/Files/FLVol204.pdf (last visited Aug. 27, 2007) (“[M]uch of
the facilities and infrastructure that make up the Defense Fuel Supply Point (DFSP)
date back to the early 1900s. . . .  The base was established in 1903 as a coaling station
and to this day abides by the original treaty as a support point for the refueling
ships.”).
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that time, powerful states were just starting to engage in the prac-
tice of establishing foreign naval bases.  Foreign bases, by virtue of
being outside a state’s sovereign territory, and often at a distance
from it, had different operational requirements and activities than
those bases within the state.128
The Guanta´namo Bay lease did not specify restrictions other
than those that prohibited commercial or industrial activity.129
This was at a time when governments saw their roles as providing
essential services that today are partially or completely performed
by the private sector in many states.130  The lease did not foresee
this evolution, and over time interpretations of the lease’s restric-
tions on activity at the base became looser and allowed for it.  This
trend arguably set the stage for a more expansive definition of le-
gitimate naval base activities, and these broader activities in turn
required support of their own.
During the base’s history, permits have been issued for mer-
cantile activity, the grazing of cattle,131 entertainment facilities,
schools, transportation,132 and dairy production plants.133  Such ac-
tivities would flourish or wane according to the latest interpreta-
tions of the restrictions, as the primary uses of the base evolved in
their own right.  During the Cold War, the base was employed for
controlling Caribbean sea lanes, deterring the Soviet Union’s pres-
ence in the region and supporting potential military operations.134
In 1994-1995, it housed Cuban and Haitian refugees fleeing their
countries, and since 2002 it has been a detention center for alleged
Taliban and Al Qaeda militants.135
Use as a detention center is a principal activity, not a periph-
eral one.  With regard to Guanta´namo Bay’s current use, the U.S.
government has said that “[t]he positioning of a prison for enemy
128 Id. at 26 (“With the population of this remote location [Guanta´namo] totally
reliant on fuel for the production of power and water, and in support of essential
mission operations, a reliable and modern infrastructure becomes paramount.”).
129 Treaty Between the United States and Cuba—May 1934, supra note 81.
130 See generally, International Labor Organization (ILO), The Impact of Decentraliza-
tion and Privatization on Municipal Services (2001), available at http://www.ilo.org/pub-
lic/english/dialogue/sector/techmeet/jmms01/jmmsr.pdf.
131 Maris, supra note 6, at 266–67 (noting that permits for the grazing of cattle were
later rescinded by the Department of Navy).
132 Gerald L. Neuman, Anomalous Zones, 48 STAN L. REV. 1197, 1198 (1996).
133 POMFRET, supra note 104 (noting that Guanta´namo Bay produced its own dairy
between 1914 and 1941, and operation of its current milk plant began 1967).
134 MARK P. SULLIVAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., CUBA: ISSUES FOR THE 109TH CON-
GRESS 38 (Aug. 31, 2006), available at http://nationalaglawcenter.org/assets/crs/
RL32730.pdf.
135 Id.
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combatants from the war on terrorism has focused attention on,
and led to the revitalization of, a base that had been in a period of
decline.”136  This territory has particular value as a detention
center because of U.S. sovereignty and its extra-jurisdictional na-
ture, derived from its leased status and established to the satisfac-
tion of the U.S. government in rulings by the Eleventh Circuit
Court during the Haitian refugee influx.137  “The one thing we all
agreed on was that any detention facility should be located outside
the United States[,]” wrote John Yoo, a former deputy assistant
U.S. attorney general who was instrumental in creating the deten-
tion policy.138
B. Duration and Compensation
Maris has argued that the return of Guanta´namo Bay to Cu-
ban control was envisioned by Cuba when it sought to lease the
area rather than sell the area:  “[T]he legal term ‘lease’ was not a
disguise for the actual cession of Guanta´namo to the United States
but a relinquishing of jurisdiction over the area with the legal pos-
sibility of eventual recovery if the parties so desired or if conditions
of the lease were not met.”139
After the Cuban Revolution of 1959 led to hostile relations be-
tween the U.S. and Cuba, duration arose as a prominent issue.
Cuba wished to terminate the arrangement, but there was no provi-
sion allowing it to do so unilaterally, as there was for the U.S.140
Meanwhile, the antagonism between the states reinforced the mili-
tary and political interests of the U.S. in retaining the base.141
These interests fostered the misperception that the lease had a per-
petual term—to the point that both states began referring to it as
such.  Statements by the U.S. government today note that “Guanta´-
namo Bay is the oldest U.S. base overseas, operating since 1903
when the U.S. government obtained a perpetual lease,”142 and that
136 Rhem, supra note 103.
137 Neuman, supra note 132, at 1200 (citing Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc. v. Baker, 953
F.2d 1498, 1513 n.8 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1122 (1992)). See also Cuban Am.
Bar Ass’n. Inc. v. Christopher, 43 F.3d 1412, 1424–25 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S.
913 (1995); JOHN YOO, WAR BY OTHER MEANS: AN INSIDER’S ACCOUNT OF THE WAR ON
TERROR 142–43 (Atlantic Monthly Press 2006) (discussing a particular case where the
absence of federal rights for Haitian refugees suggested that Guanta´namo Bay was
outside U.S. habeas jurisdiction).
138 Id. at 142.
139 Maris, supra note 6, at 263.
140 Treaty Between the United States and Cuba—May 1934, supra note 81, at 1162.
141 Murphy, supra note 125, Vol. 1, Ch. 12.
142 U.S. Library of Congress, Places in the News—Cuba (on file with The New York
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“the base was leased in 1903 for $2,000 per year on a perpetual
basis.”143
In making its own contradictory statements on the duration of
the lease, Cuba’s government has both denied and confirmed the
validity of the treaty.  Cuba has argued that the treaty is void be-
cause its government did not have the legal competence to cede
part of the territory by means of a “lease in perpetuity.”144  But
Cuba has also made a separate argument that relies on the treaty
being valid and that Guanta´namo Bay should revert to Cuban con-
trol because “being based on a lease, it is a temporary—not perpet-
ual—occupation of part of our territory, and that . . . in due course
it must be peacefully returned to Cuba.”145
Termination of the lease has been envisioned by the U.S. in
the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act of
1996,146 which made it government policy “[t]o be prepared to
enter into negotiations with a democratically elected government
in Cuba either to return the United States Naval Base at Guanta-
namo to Cuba or to renegotiate the present agreement under mu-
tually agreeable terms.”147
International law scholars have suggested several other legal
scenarios by which the lease might be ended—a finding that Cuba
was coerced into accepting the Platt Amendment as a condition for
independence, or that the current activities at Guanta´namo Bay
constitute a material breach of the treaty that limits its uses to a
coaling station or naval base, or that rebus sic stantibus is justified in
view of the fundamental change of political circumstances that fol-
lowed the 1959 Cuban Revolution.148  Another argument questions
whether the lease is compatible with the principle of self-determi-
City Law Review); see also Rhem, supra note 103 (“At 101 years old, Naval Base Guanta-
namo Bay is America’s oldest active overseas military base.”).
143 Rhem, supra note 103.
144 DIRECTION DE L’INFORMATION, MINISTERE DES AFFAIRES ETRANGERES, REPUBLIQUE
DE CUBA, GUANTANAMO:  BASE NAVALE YANKEE DE CRIMES ET PROVOCATIONS 25 (In-
stituto del Libro 1970), translated in GUANTA´NAMO–YANKEE NAVAL BASE OF CRIMES AND
PROVOCATIONS 29 (U.S. DEPT. OF DEF. 1977), available at http://stinet.dtic.mil/oai/
oai?&verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA373599 (follow “http://
handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA373599” hyperlink).
145 Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de Cuba, Guanta´namo, U.S. Black Hole,
available at http://america.cubaminrex.cu/CDH/60cdh/Guantanamo/English/
White%20Book.
146 Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act of 1996 § 201, 22
U.S.C. §§ 6021–6091 (1996).
147 Id. § 6061(12) (2001).
148 Margalida Capella` i Roig, El estatuto jurı´dico de Guanta´namo (Cuba), 54 REVISTA
ESPAN˜OLA DE DERECHO INTERNACIONAL 773, 778–79 (2002) (Spain).
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nation embodied in the Charter of the United Nations.149
Opponents of these arguments point out, for example, that
there is no evidence of coercion when the lease was reaffirmed in
1934,150 and that the initial U.S. right to occupy Guanta´namo did
not derive from treaties or agreements with what later became the
state of Cuba. Thus, “[n]o need . . . exists to consider or to accom-
modate the policies of rebus sic stantibus with pacta sunt servanda in-
sofar as the United States’ rights of occupation in Guantanamo are
concerned.”151
The Cuban government has not initiated proceedings in any
legal forum to recover control over Guanta´namo Bay, despite the
chance that Cuba could benefit from a tribunal or arbitration pro-
cedure (there may be political risks, but the legal risk is nil because
an unfavorable judgment would simply reaffirm the status quo).  In
fact, Cuba has intentionally adopted a policy of not making the re-
turn of Guanta´namo Bay a high priority152 because circumstances
have never existed to produce an accurate legal and diplomatic
discourse—a pragmatic stance in view of the relative political and
military strengths of the two states, which Ninth Circuit Court
Judge Graber noted in her dissent in Gherebi v. Bush,153 and per-
haps also in view of the inconsistent legal arguments that Cuba has
put forth about the lease’s validity.
However, the International Court of Justice decision in Min-
quiers and Ecrehos, which awarded disputed territory to the United
Kingdom over France on grounds that the British had exercised
jurisdiction and administrative activity,154 shows that Cuba could
risk losing title to Guanta´namo Bay by being entirely passive with
respect to asserting its claim for control over it.  As a result, Cuba
149 de Zayas, supra note 84, at 304–05 citing 23 May 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [Vienna
Convention].
150 Maris, supra note 6, at 276–78.   A communication from the Cuban Secretary of
State to the American Ambassador stated the 1903 lease provisions retained in the
Treaty of 1934:
[re-affirmation of the lease] did so “by virtue of the free and sovereign
will of the people of Cuba.”  The lack of records on the negotiation of
this treaty which makes it impossible to refute the accuracy of the pre-
ceding statement [and] has the effect of vindicating the United States
against any charge of duress which may previously have been valid.
Id. at 278.
151 Lazar, supra note 120, at 740.
152 Statement from the Ministry of Foreign Relations, supra note 71.
153 Gherebi v. Bush, 352 F.3d 1278, 1309–13 (9th Cir. 2003) (Graber. J., dissent-
ing), vacated, 542 U.S. 952 (2004).
154 Minquiers and Ecrehos, 1953–55 I.C.J. at 72.
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pursues modest but visible acts of resistance.155  As Alfred de Zayas
notes:
Cuba, of course, has no possibility to expel the United States
from Guanta´namo; it can only protest, and its protests have the
function in international law of frustrating any eventual United
States contention about putative Cuban acquiescence, thus
preventing the U.S. from being able to claim sovereignty over
the territory by virtue of occupation and prescription.156
Cuba uses two vehicles for this resistance – public rhetoric in
its conduct of international relations, and the compensatory aspect
of the lease.  Events show that its rhetorical denunciations of the
U.S. occupation of Guanta´namo Bay can be inconsistent with its
actions regarding the territory.  Thus, while Cuba has cited the cur-
rent use of the base as a detention center as justifying an end to the
lease,157 it acquiesced to this use when contacted by U.S. authori-
ties in advance and stated as the operation was starting:
We will not create obstacles to the development of the opera-
tion.  Having been advised of it and conscious that it requires a
large movement of personnel and means of aerial transport, the
Cuban authorities will maintain contact with the personnel of
the base in the adoption of measures that impede the risk of
accidents.158
In regard to the compensation stipulated by the lease, the U.S.
has continued to make annual rent payments for Guanta´namo Bay,
but these have been transformed from reflecting the true value of
the territory159 into token payments because the lease had no pro-
vision for adjusting the rental amount.  With the phasing out of
gold coins and changes in the value of gold in dollar terms, the
$2,000 payable in gold coins eventually became $4,085 payable by
155 de Zayas, supra note 84, at 290–91 (noting that since 1959 Cuba has expressed
the view that the American presence in Guanta´namo Bay constitutes an illegal
occupation).
156 Id. at 291 (citing Fidel Castro, Fidel Castro Speeches:  1984–1985 (Pathfinder
Press 1985) at 99–100) (quoting Fidel Castro as stating in a January 11, 1985 speech
delivered in Nicaragua) (“What interest can we have in waging a war with our neigh-
bors. . . .  We do not intend to recover it with the use of arms. . . .  If some day it will
be ours, it will not be by the use of force, but by the advance of the consciousness of
justice in the world.”).
157 Id. at 307–08.
158 Statement from the Ministry of Foreign Relations, supra note 71 (quotation
translated by author).
159 Interview by Vivien Sequera with Rau´l Castro Ruz, Cuban Defense Minister, at
the Loma Malones Observation Point, Guanta´namo (Jan. 19, 2002), available at http:/
/www.cubapolidata.com/cafr/news/2002-1.html#3 (last visited Aug. 11, 2007). “[I]n
Cuba during the U.S. occupation, there were places where you could buy a hectare of
land for 10 U.S. cents[,]” Castro said. Id.
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check,160 but it still represents the 1903 value of the territory itself.
Cuba has refused to cash the checks after 1959 “in rejection of
what it justly considers to be an illegal usurpation of a portion of its
territory.”161  Whether this legally constitutes rejection of the funds
is another issue, as Cuba continues to accept the checks that are
convertible into the funds.
“The U.S. does annually pay the $4,085 in the form of a U.S.
Treasury check.  This check is transmitted to the Cuban govern-
ment by the U.S. Interests Section in Havana on or before July,”
according to a U.S. government official familiar with Cuba and
Guanta´namo Bay.162  The check is not refused upon receipt or sub-
sequently returned to the U.S., according to the official.  “It’s not
rejected, but I’ve never seen any evidence that the Cubans . . . have
cashed the checks,” he said.163
The U.S. considers that under commercial law, it complies
with its obligation as payor by providing the check to Cuba’s gov-
ernment, according to the official.164  The U.S. has not sought to
make payment by alternate means such as electronic funds transfer
due to “the absence of normal banking relations between the U.S.
and Cuba,” he said.165
U.S. Treasury checks have no validity after a year,166 resulting
in the U.S. having access to leased territory at Guanta´namo Bay at
no cost.  This occurs without any substantive financial consequence
to Cuba because the annual payment has become a token amount
160 Strauss, supra note 2, at 131 (citing Gitmo Detainees Get New Deal (CBS television
broadcast Dec. 6, 2002)) (noting that the $2,000 annual payment by the U.S. to Cuba
has been unchanged since the 1903 “treaty’s stipulation that the payment be made ‘in
gold coin’ makes the effective value today roughly $4,000”).
161 Embassy of Cuba in the United Kingdom, Facts About the U.S. Naval Base at Guan-
tanamo, http://www.cubaldn.com/englishFiles (follow “FACTS ABOUT THE U S NA-
VAL BASE IN GUANTANAMO.pdf” hyperlink) (last visited Aug. 11, 2007).
162 Telephone interview with the official, who spoke “on background” (information
is given on condition that the source is not identified); he agreed to be described as




166 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 4 FAH-3 H-340, FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT PROCEDURES
HANDBOOK 5–6 (1995), available at http://foia.state.gov/masterdocs/04fah03/
04fah030340.pdf (last visited Aug. 12, 2007).
All checks drawn on the Treasurer of the United States must be negoti-
ated within 12 months after the date of issue. Unnegotiated USG [US
Government] Checks are canceled 14 months after issue by Treasury.
Valid claims against checks canceled by Treasury may be re-submitted
for certification and issuance of a check(s).
Id. at 6.
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that Cuba calculates as 37.4 cents per hectare.167
VII. ANALYSIS AND IMPLICATIONS
The situation at present appears to offer the U.S. a remarkably
smooth path toward obtaining title to Guanta´namo Bay through
prescription.  It has displayed effective control and jurisdiction
over an extended period, as required by Minquiers and Ecrehos.168
Cuba has consistently behaved passively toward the territory as evi-
denced by its policy of not prioritising Guanta´namo’s recovery
through legal means and thereby not bringing the case to an inter-
national tribunal or arbitration; and by acquiescing to specific U.S.
activities on the territory that are counter to its arguments that they
violate the treaty’s restrictions.169  Moreover, Cuba’s own municipal
law considers Guanta´namo Bay to be foreign territory as the result
of a 1934 decision by its Supreme Court.170  Finally, the transforma-
tion of the rent amount to a token level that Cuba does not convert
into cash renders the compensation aspect of the lease, once mate-
rial, inconsequential.
The significance of the last point is that a halt in rent pay-
ments by the U.S. would not be a serious enough breach of the
treaty to render it void and cause control over Guanta´namo Bay to
revert to Cuba.  Indeed, Laly-Chevalier suggests it may not even be
a violation.  “One does not find in general international law any
precise definition of the violation of a treaty,” she writes,171 adding
that a true violation is serious enough to affect the very substance
of the treaty and that non-compliance with minor elements “do not
generally qualify as violations.”172
Thus, while Cuba may have retained sovereignty over Guanta´-
namo Bay through the lease, it may no longer be in a position to
control whether it can keep that sovereignty.  This raises a question
about whether “ultimate sovereignty” remains true sovereignty
once its continued existence becomes dependent on another sov-
167 Interview with Rau´l Castro Cruz, supra note 159.
168 Minquiers and Ecrehos, 1953–55 I.C.J. at 67.
169 Embassy of Cuba in the United Kingdom, supra note 161.
170 Lazar, supra note 120, at 738 (citing In re Guzman & Latamble, Annual Digest &
Reports of Pub. Int’l Law Cases, 1933–34, Case No. 43, 112 (Cuba Sup. Ct. 1994)).
Here, the court declared that “the territory of that naval station is for all legal effects
regarded as foreign.” Id.  This was in February 1934, before the treaty in May reaf-
firmed the lease.  Capella` i Roig, supra note 148, at 781.
171 CAROLINE LALY–CHEVALIER, LA VIOLATION DU TRAITE 126 (Editions Bruylant/
Editions de l’Universite´ de Bruxelles 2005) (quotation translated by Author).
172 Id. at 138.
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ereign state.   A policy change by the U.S. government may be all
that is necessary for Guanta´namo Bay’s title to shift to the U.S.
By continuing to pay the rent, however, the U.S. annually dis-
plays its acceptance of the lease and its affirmation of Cuban sover-
eignty over the territory—a situation that has value for the U.S. in
two respects.  From the standpoint of international relations, it per-
mits the U.S. to seek changes in Cuba’s form of government by
offering the incentive of terminating or changing the lease.  From
a legal perspective, maintaining Guanta´namo Bay as a leased area
with neither U.S. sovereignty nor Cuban jurisdiction preserves the
territory’s character as an extra-jurisdictional entity.
Neuman refers to such an entity as an “anomalous zone”
where “certain legal rules, otherwise regarded as embodying funda-
mental policies of the larger legal system, are locally suspended.”173
He notes that such geographical exceptions to fundamental poli-
cies can be dangerous for the policies’ basic values.174  “In a sense,
any exception to a rule tests the firmness of the rule.  Exceptions
may multiply, and even if they do not, the rule is only as strong as
the barriers to bringing oneself within the exception.”175  Addition-
ally, he asserts “within an anomalous zone, disrespect for one fun-
damental value may breed disrespect for others.”176
Exceptions to a rule may spread vertically, within a state, but
they can also spread horizontally, among states.  The use of Guan-
ta´namo Bay as a detention center has been referenced by foreign
governments to justify deviations from their established legal pro-
cedures in regard to the handling of suspected terrorists or other
persons deemed to be security threats.177
It is common for states to replicate the behavior of other states
when faced with similar situations, producing what political scien-
tists call an international regime – defined by Krasner as a set of
“principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around
which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of interna-
173 Neuman, supra note 132, at 1201.
174 Id. at 1233.
175 Id. at 1234.
176 Id.
177 Harold Hongju Koh, Gerard C. and Bernice Latrobe Smith Professor of Interna-
tional Law, Yale Law School, John Galway Foster Lecture: The United States and
Human Rights after September 11th, Remarks Before the University College, London
(Oct. 21, 2003) (transcript available at http://www.blackstonechambers.com/pdf-
Files/Blackstone_JGF%20Lecture.pdf) (last visited Aug. 12, 2007). Remarks were
given prior to his appointment as Dean of Yale Law School.
2007] INTERNATIONAL LEASES AND SERVITUDES 509
tional relations.”178  Regimes provide the models of state behaviour
that act as a source of customary international law,179 and Stein
writes that common interests and aversions among states are
among the factors that allow regimes to develop.180
The legal decisions surrounding the use of Guanta´namo Bay
as a detention center highlight the territory’s extra-jurisdictional
aspect and create the conditions for a new regime to emerge
around this point.  Historically, states have gravitated toward using
leased territories for similar types of activities, and legal decisions
that support the definition of one leased territory as an extra-juris-
dictional zone may give other leased territories intrinsic value as
such.
This raises the possibility that leased territories, simply by vir-
tue of being leased, may be employed for practices not conducted
on other types of territories where sovereignty and jurisdiction are
more firmly established.  These practices may be entirely in har-
mony with established municipal and international law, but they
also may not be, and the habeas corpus issue and others that have
arisen at Guanta´namo Bay have brought this into focus.
No comprehensive world inventory exists of leased territories
and their associated servitudes, but there are probably hundreds, if
not thousands, when minor sites such as diplomatic missions are
included.  The influence of the legal developments involving
Guanta´namo Bay on the future of these territories, and on interna-
tional law in general, seems far from over.
178 Stephen D. Krasner, Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Interven-
ing Variables, in INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 1, 2 (Stephen D. Krasner ed., 1983).
179 SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 1, at 58.  (“[C]ustomary law is founded
upon the performance of state activities and the convergence of practices, in other
words, what states actually do.”).
180 Arthur A. Stein, Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic World, in
INTERNATIONAL REGIMES, supra note 178, at 115, 127.

